Introduction
Market structure research makes a sharp distinction between financial markets that are quote-driven markets and those that are orderdriven markets. Quote-driven markets rely on dealers to compete to provide the most attractive quotes to buy and to sell shares. Examples are the U.S. government bond market, the foreign exchange market, and the Nasdaq stock market. In an orderdriven market, prices are established by limit orders to buy and sell that are submitted to a limit order book by traders and investors [lo] . Examples are the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange. Both structures have their advantages, and neither can claim to be closer to the economic ideal of a perfect market. More advanced technology and growing competition between markets, however, have given rise to opportunities for stock exchanges to combine the two trading mechanisms.
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Several of the major stock exchanges that are dealer markets -including the London Stock Exchange W E ) and Nasdaq in the U.S. -are in the midst of designing new trading systems and evaluating chang market structures. In the U.S., the Sec Exchange Commission (SEC) has r e a Nasdaq modify its systems to:
"... "~ecause] the current allow trades to be executed on a 'patient' basis, without paying for the cost of risk capital ... the Exchange intends to provide a vibrant and attractive order book liquidity and immediacy for a significant p trades on the Exchange." "... there could be a combined quote-and orderdriven system [for the BE], a possibility known as the 'hybrid' approach. Marketmakers oppose a hybrid, arguing it would not provide high enough returns ... [However] large investors have made it clear they want some form of camp-order-matching system. This would keep costs down by cutting out the middleman." ("optiolu for One contention is that a limit order facility will benefit the market by reducing costs and providmg gmtter flexibility to investors. A counter-argument is that an orderdriven facility will damage dealer firms, and eliminate their profits and willingness t o provide liquidity to the market. It is also possible that a limit order facility in competition with dealers will simply not attract enough orders to be relevant and to have an effect on market quality.
To test these conjectures, we have developed an experimental trading environment designed to facilitate the assessment of these market design modifications. This
paper:
Shows how computer simulation can be used to evaluate the effects of market structure changes by capturing data on subjects' order placement behavior and on market quality.
0
Details an experimental design in which live participants, playing the role of customer order entry firms, interact with the simulated market under three different market structure conditions.
-The first scenario is a base case with a pure dealer market in which users can only submit market orders.
-The second scenario integrates a limit order book with the dealer quotes, and enable users to enter both market orders and limit order.
-In the third scenario, the dealers are given an informational advantage that enables them to trade more aggressively.
Presents summary data from the tests and analyzes the findings.
Contains our conclusions concerning the effectiveness of simulation as an analytic tool for stock markets that are considering structural changes.
The paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 discusses the simulation and the functions the computer performs in providing a controlled trading environment. Section 3 provides background on our experimental design, and presents three hypotheses concerning participant order placement behavior. Section 4 explains how we conducted the experiments. Section 5 presents the results of the experiments, and the hypothesis tests. The final section, Section 6, provides a conclusion and an outline of our future work. An appendix contains the structural details of the simulation model, and describes the layout of the computer screens, the generation of quotes and orders, dealer behavior, and the benchmark statistic used to measure participant performance.
Simulation of a Realistic Market Environment
The objective of our computer simulation is to provide a backdrop for assessing the market decisions of live participants. Specifically, we have created a controlled background of public order flow and market maker quote setting that can interact with a user. This has enabled us to examine a dealer market, and a combined dealer and order book market. The advantage of simulation over theoretical modeling is that "theorizing" requires abstracting away from some of the very details of market structure that exchange officials and regulators wish to study. Consequently, theoretical modeling can give only limited insight into the effects of market design changes on the behavior of market participants. The advantage of simulation vis-a-vis empirically testing of new market structures is that the simulated experiments can be run at much lower cost, and across a broader range of altematives. For our experiments, discrete event computer simulation accomplishes the following. It:
Establishes the individual bid and ask quotes of five dealers. The quotes are dynamically updated as orders arrive, as trades are made, and as the dealers' inventories reach position limits (both long and short).
Generates a public order flow that can (i) execute against the dealer quotes, and in two of the three test scenarios, can (ii) be placed on a public limit order book for later execution, or (iii) execute against the public limit order book.
Gives the live participants instructions to buy a certain quantity of stock. Dependiug on the test scenario, the live participants can (i) execute these orders against dealer quotes, (ii) place them on a public limit order book, or (iii) execute them against the public limit order book.
Maintains the screen which displays (i) the quotes of the five dealers, (ii) orders on the public limit order book, (iii) a time stamped record of all transaction sizes and prices for each trading session, and (iv) the value of the market index.
Captures information concerning (i) the live participants' decisions and (ii) market quality measures such as bid-ask spreads. This information is assessed to determine the effect of market structure on the behavior of market participants.
In our human-machine interactive environment, the computer can generate orders from an unlimited number of "machine-resident" traders and investors. This enables us easily to satisfy the conditions fo market. This facilitates assessing of all participants in an our use of live subjects. . Themodelallows for trading just one asset; thus, arbitrage and "pairs" trading are not possible. The subjects' computers are connected in a network each live participant interacts with the model and his screen individually. Thus, negotiation between two or more live participants is not possible. Further complexity along these and other lines could be added in the future, and the live participants could be given further training, if needed, before participating in more sophisticated experimentation.
The simulation reflects the runs and reversals in price changes that characterize the dynamic process of price adjustments in real world markets. These patterns give the live participants a rich environment to operate within, and in which to make decisions. The runs and reversal are introduced as follows.
We specify an equilibrium (balance) price, P*, that reflects the broad market's assessment of the value of the stock Brownian motion diffusion assumption in the finance literature
The live participants do not see P*. Given P* and the current level of the best bid and offer on the market, orders are generated by three types of machine traders defined below: liquidity traders, informed traders, and momentum traders.
Liquidity traders are simply adding or withdrawing cash from their portfolios without reference to any privileged information about the stock. Liquidity orders are obtained by drawing orders from a distribution located in relation to the market bid and ask quotes.
Informed traders have special knowledge that the market prim are too high or too low relative to P*. Their orders are obtained by referencing the equilibrium price, P*, and by drawing orders from a tight distribution around P* whenever P* lies outside the bid-ask spread.
Momentum t d e r s buy or sell when they believe that informationdriven trading is Occurring. Momentum orders are obtained by increasing the probability that the next order will be a buy (or a sell) whenever three or more buy orders (or sell orders) arrive consecutively P* follows a random walk jump process. After the equilibrium value jumps randomly from one level to another (which it does from time-to-time), the orders of the informed traders pull the quotes and transaction prices to -and cause them to trend towards -the new level.
Occasionally, market prices can also trend away from P* because of the orders of momentum traders. However, movements away from P* are unsustainable; eventually, price reverses and heads back towards P*. The appendix provides additional details on the model.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In the tests, subjects played the simulation game in groups. Roughly one hour was devoted to explaining the simulation and to allowing the subjects to practice entering orders in the market, and one hour was devoted to formal testing. The experiment had three different simulation environments, each of which took about twenty minutes to complete.
Each laboratory session lasted two hours.
Subjects' Decisions. In the simulation, live participants played the role of public order entry firms, and at different points during the experiment each received computergenerated "instructions" to buy a quantity of shares. Giving only buy orders was a way of simplifying the subjects' decisions and of controlling complexity. The quantity a user was given was two to three times larger than the 25 "share" maximum order that can be entered in the simulated market. Thus, the instructions could be fully executed in one trade; this required subjects to exercise discretion in when to submit market and limit orders. Each test run covered three simulated days of trading, each of which lasted a simulated 6 112 hours (from 9:30 am to 4:OO pm). In a typical simulated day, a subject received two buy "instructions. " These orders plus computer-generated orders resulted in about 100 trades a day. The subjects were participants in about ten percent of the trading activity. At the end of a simulation run, any unfilled buy instructions were automatically executed by the computer. This treatment of otherwise unfilled orders encouraged participants to obtain fills before the end of a trading session, but did not penalize them unduly, for this could have undermined their willingness to trade patiently.
Incentives. The participants in a laboratory session were ranked by a performance measure, and each was given a payment in dollars at the end of the session that depended on his or her relative ranking for the session. (Casb payments ranged from $20 to $30 for two hours. Payments were not made in the practitioner experiment. Instead, results were tabulated and displayed.) The buy instructions given would create "market impact" and drive up prices if submitted as market orders in large pieces. The performance measure for each participant was constructed as follows. Each time the participant brings all or part of an order to the market, the computer assesses the average share price that would be obtained if the order were brought to the market in its entirety and executed at one or more prices. We refer to this price as the "benchmark price." The participant's "profit" for any trade is the benchmark price minus the actual purchase price, times the number of shares bought. The participant's performance measure is the cumulative profits over all trades. After each experimental session, participants in the session were ranked by their performance measure and paid accordingly. Knowing that their payouts depended on their performance induced the subjects to perform well.
Careful order handling enabled subjects to increase their performance " r e by buying at lower prices.
Orders can be "worked" by breaking them up into smaller pieces, and by placing limit orders Figure 1) . However, if a user's limit buy order executes because informed sellers are in the process of driving the prices down, then the benchmark price will be marked down accordingly (since the buy order could have been executed at a lower price later). Buying at the beginning of a downtrend (uptrend) and the subject will receive a relatively poor (good) profit score for the trade. In effect, the profit score on a trade reflects "ex-post regret" of trading. If a trader buys, and subsequently realizes he could have bought for less later, the benchmark will fall and profit will be small, or negative. If the trader buys and prices rise, the benchmark and profits will be greater. This provides realistic incentives to trade strategically and cost-effectively. In total, overly eager order handling is likely to result in low scores because of market impact, and excessively patient trading commonly resulted in poor scores because of undesirable limit order executions following informational change.
FIGURE 1: Market Order and Limit Order Illustration
Assume that in the combined quote-and orderdriven market structure, the expressions of trading interest reflected below exist. The stock currently has a bid quote of 24 1/4, which reflects the limit order to'buy 15. Three dealers have a bid quote of 24 1/8, which is inferior to the limit order buyer willing to pay 24 1/4. The best offer to sell is at 24 1/2 by Dealers #1 and #3. The lowest limit order to sell is at 24 5/8, which is inferior to the dealers' ask quotes.
A dealer's quote is good for up to 25 units. However, after a trade occurs, the dealers have the option to move their quotes. This implies that it may not be possible to buy 50 at the current offer price of 24 1/2. LIMIT ORDER STRATEGY. To execute an order to buy, an investor could place a limit buy order (a bid) at 24 318 or less. If entered at 24 3/8, it does not immediately execute, but supersedes the bid of 24 114. The hope is that a market sell order arrives and executes against the limit buy order at 24 318, or that a dealer that has become long the stock sells to the limit order.
MARKET ORDER STRATEGY.
Under the same circumstances, an investor using a market order can buy immediately a t the offer price of 24 112.
The limit order trader can avoid the cost of immediate execution ($114 in this example). Limit orders however face the risk of not executing, and the risk that the price will move adversely while they are on the book. For instance, the offer price could move higher without the limit order at 2 4 318 executing. Better bid prices could be entered, and a buyer that initially unsuccessfully to use a limit order may end regret and paying more than 24 112 for the stock.
Empirical data on limit order is based on a limit order book specialist, in each stock. comparable to the competing dealer and order orders that arrive via the SuperDOT entry system are limit orders, and 73 percent of the shares in orders submitted are limit orders. 44 percent of the shares submitted as limit ly execute.
[9]
A hybrid trading system will be viable only if its component trading mechanisms are adequately utilized. Of fundamental interest in our experiments is which the live participants actually use limit use of limit orders can be measured in two ways: the level (the actual frequency with which limit orders are placed) and the change of the b e l (how the
The experiments enable us to test three hypotheses:
Hl) Live participants will use orders when market bid-ask spreads are wider.
The bid-ask spread is the price and at higher values it will enc greater the price of immedi participant should be to enter limit o order use. The
€32)
frequently when dealers have an informational advantage regarding the location of P*.
In actual markets, some public customers are at ti informational disadvantage vis-a-vis deal
Participants will use limit orders
rs may capitalize on informational advantag and by "picking off" mispriced limit hypothesize that, if the dealers do so, the will be discouraged from using limi were given more of an informational 3 than in Scenarios 1 and 2. Users were not directly notified of the change, but saw that dealers' quoted spreads went from $0.50 to $0.75 in Scenario 3.
H3) The limit order book will reduce dealer profits by "disintennediating" some of the trading volume, but the order-driven facility will give dealers a aew way to lay off positions and reduce risk.
A limit order book can provide liquidity to dealers as well as other investors. Since market makers generally tend to avoid large long or short positions, the presence of limit orders can help dealers to control their risk and reduce the size of their losses from adverse price movements. The reduction in dealer profits (from trading lower volumes after the introduction of a limit order book) could be offset by a reduction in losses once they are able to lay off risks via the order book.
To test the hypotheses above, we vary market conditions by defining three alternative scenarios, and by assessing the participants' differential use of limit orders in these three environments. The first environment includes a dealer screen only (that is, there is no limit order facility). The second and third scenarios, which include a limit order facility, are differentiated by (i) the average price of dealer-provided immediacy, and (ii) the dealers' ability to have superior knowledge of the equilibrium (balance) price, P*.
Subjects undertook the buying exercise in three scenarios, detailed below: Scenario #1 Market w i t h uninformed dealers who have no special information concerning the location of P* and its changes. Dealer quotes are relatively wide (about 3% of share price). Hence, the price of dealer provided immediacy is relatively high. All trading takes place via market orders trading at dealers' quoted bid and ask prices.
Scenario #2 Uninformed dealers with quote-setting as in #I. The limit order book is integrated into the market, and price priority is enforced so that a limit order at a better price than the best dealer quote will trade first. If the best dealer quote and the best limit order are tied at the same price, then the quote or order placed earliest has priority. o #3 Dealers are informed of P* changes abut half the time, giving them better information concerning the location of P* than the live participants. It is reasonable to assume that with better information, dealer quotes can be narrowed and the price of dealer-provided immediacy made relatively low without losses. Dealers will reduce the bid-ask spread from $314 in Scenarios 1 and 2, to $112 in Scenario 3.
The informkional advantage of dealers in Scenario 3 was controlled as followed. As noted in Section 2, the simulation includes an underlying equilibrium (or balance) price, P*. Displayed quotes and transaction prices differ from the P* level after a change in P* or when temporarily pushed away from P* by momentum traders or chance, one-sided liquidity order flow. Within this structure, we can give the dealers a controllable informational advantage vis-a-vis the live participant by conditioning dealer trading and quote-adjustment behavior, in part, on their knowledge of P*. Operationally this works as follows. In Scenario 1 and 2, we gave the dealers no special information about P*, but in Scenario 3 we inform the dealers of P*'s new value half of the time that P* changes. When the dealers know the new value of P* and it is below public buy limit orders (or -above public sell limit orders), the dealers sell to the overpriced public bids with their own sell orders (or buy from the underpriced public offers with their own buy orders); in the process, they adjust their bid and offer quotes to straddle P*. We have verified that the profits of the machine dealers are indeed controlled via the strength of the information signal given to them (see Section 5 and Table 5 in particular).
Conduct of the Experiments
Our tests comprised four laboratory sessions conducted with four students each (16 subjects), and one group of 8 industry participants (24 total subjects). Eight of the subjects were Ph.D. students at NYU's Stem School of Business, and eight were graduate students at the Wharton School. Each experimental session lasted two hours. Roughly one hour was spent introducing the participants to the experiment and the simulation, and to letting them practice entering orders into the simulated market. One hour was then devoted to running the formal tests.
Each formal test period was divided into three 20-minute windows. The subjects completed one scenario in each 20-minute interval. The first 20-minute period included the dealer only environment, while a limit order facility was included in the second and third periods. In the second 2O-minute period we used the "Uninformed dealer" environment, and in the third 2O-minute period w e used the "informed dealer" environment.
Fundamental parametric values, such as P* variability and the order arrival rate, were held constant across all simulation runs, and the tests were structured so ohat valid, ceteris paribus contrasts could be made. However, it was necessary to start each new simulation runs for each of the 20-minute periods with a different random number seed to keep the subjects ignorant about what the new price changes would be. Table 1 presents a breakdown of the subjects' orders by type of order and Scenario: Scenario 1 is dealers only, Scenario 2 is uninformed dealer and limit order facility, and Scenario 3 is informed dealers and limit order facility. It is interesting in Table 1 that the live subjects used limit orders about as much as they used myket orders in Scenarios 2 and 3 (the only scenarios where they are allowed). Limit orders ranged from 46% to 57% of the total orders submitted. Because not all limit orders execute, market orders were used for over half of the shares actually bought. The data from the industry subjects are reported in Table 1 , but because meaningful differences did not appear, we report all subsequent data in aggregate. Table 2 shows the frequency with which the various spread values occurred, and the frequency with which market orders are entered at different values of the spread. Examining columns (3), (6), and (9) in Table 2 , we see that the use of market orders diminishes when the spread is at its widest level (e.g., 518 and 3/4). E.g., in Scenario 1 the bid-ask spread was 518 or 314 36.9% of the time, but only 23.4% of the total market orders were placed when the spread was that wide. The dealers' spread was reduced from 314 to 1/2 in Scenario 3, and as a result the maximum market spread is 112, and no data cells are needed in the lower right of the table. Table 3 shows the frequency with which limit orders are entered at different values of the spread. Examining columns (3) and (6) in Table 3 , we see that limit orders are used at all values of the spread, but they are used least when the spread is narrowest (1/8 and U4). Tables 1-4 , we conclude that the subjects are responding rationally to the existence of the limit order book. They use limit orders when allowed to do so. They cut back on their use of market orders at very wide spreads. Use of limit orders is positively dated to the costs of immediacy as they vary during a simulation run in the experimental environment.
TestResults
Use of limit orders increases as the spread widens from 1/8 and 1/4 to 3/8 and 112. And, the subjects cut back on their use of limit orders when the limit orders are at risk of being picked off by better info& dealers (Scenario 3 compared with scenario 2 ) . Table 5 presents additional summary statistics for the three scenarios. Comparing scenario 1. to the others, the introduction of the limit order facility narrows the bid-ask spread, reducing trading costs for investors. The dealers' share of trading volume falls from 100% in Scenario 1 to about 64% in Scenario 2. This indicates that investor limit orders are able to provide liquidity to arriving market orders over a third of the time. In the hybrid market, the need for deder intermediaries is reduced, but not eliminated. In Scenario 3, when dealers are informed and tighten the bid-ask spreads that they each quote to 1/2 from 314, they regab market share, and are counterparties to over threequarters of trading volume.
In Scenarios 1 and 2, dealer profits were negative on average. Adjusting the simulation parameters, such as lowering the P* volatility, would be likely to raise dealer profits. However, the more important result is that dealer profits in basis points are nearly unchanged from scenario 1 to Scenario 2. Our third hwthesis fdisintermediation w i l l lower dealer Drofits) is not S U D D O~~~~. In fact, the dealers' average position size decreases about 2!5% as a result of competition from limit orders and dealers ability to off-load positions. In Scenario 3, when dealers are informed about P* changes, profits are improved. This is no doubt due to their ability to know which positions to off-load, and to quote the "right" price and avoid losses from tradiag with informed investors. The implications of steady dealer margins but a reduced share of trading occurring with the dealers from Scenarios 1 and 2 are that absolute profit levels of dealers will fall in a combined market structure unless overall order flow and trading volume increase. Another effect of the orderdriven facility is a reduction in interdder trading volumes.
Conclusions and Future Research
The market simulation experiment provided a trading environment that we use to test the complex characteristics of a hybrid dealer screen and a public limit order facility. The simulation was kept simple enough to be workable for the live subjects, but also rich enough to generate useful results. The subjects had no difficulty learning how to interact with the simulation, and appeared to find the exercise interesting and enjoyable.
The simulation runs generated a considerable amount of data which we captured. The important results are:
The subjects used the limit order facility actively, and dealers saw some of the trading activity bypass them as investor limit orders met investor market orders in the order book.
The subjects use of the order book reduced the market's bid-ask spread.
The relative use of limit orders and market orders was correlated with spread width in a reasonable fashion; wider spreads led to greater limit order submission. m e introduction of a limit order facility did reduce dealer profits in basis points, but lowered their percentage of trading volume. This implies that in a hybrid market, dealer profits will decrease in total dollar amount unless overall trading activity increases to offset the order book's volumes.
Our tests indicate that the market simulation environment is a workable device for experimental analysis of the effect of market design changes on trader behavior and market performance. We anticipate that, when further developed, it will give strong guidance on market structure issues such as how best to incorporate a limit order facility into a competing dealer environment, or how to add a periodic call market. We expect to make the following enhancements in the conduct of the experiments and in the structure of the simulation.
c -
' en&: The current *version of the simulation was kept as simple as possible so as to run valid experiments with inexperienced subjects after just one hour of training. We suggest that more complex test designs could be used if the subjects are given two to three hours of training.
2. The inclusion of buv and sell orders in the order entrv firm environment: In the current version of the simulation, the live subjects in the order entry firm environment were given buy orders only so as to keep their role as order entry firms as simple as possible. With more training, the subjects could be given both buy and sell orders. This would make their task more realistic and more challenging. It would also enable a simpler performance measure to be used. We would balance the buy and sell orders given to each subject so that, for each, the sum of all shares bought equaled the sum of all shares sold over the course of a simulation run. We would then assess each participant's performance by a simple profits calculation: the sum of all positive cash flows from sales, less the sum of all negative cash flows from purchases.
Live Subjects Should Plav the Role of D e a l e r s :
In the current tests, the live subjects played the role of order entry firms only. Tests should also be run with the subjects playing the role of dealers.
To summarize, we use computer-based simulations of a stock market as a background for examining the effects of including an order-driven trading system in a dealer/quotedriven market. The results indicate that a limit order facility will be used, that it will reduce investor trading costs, and that an active limit order facility, in and of itself, will not eliminate the profitability of dealers' activities. We found that interactive simulation is a workable device for analyzing the effect of market design changes on trader behavior and market quality. It can provide helpful direction on market structure issues to securities exchange such as Nasdaq and the LSE that are considering combining orderdriven and quote-driven tradiig systems. 
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